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http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dc2m8p62_346fz8wpgcn
http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2491
The Break-Up of Yugoslavia
Srđa Popović,   Peščanik (B-92),  23 September 2008,   The Bosnian Institute,  02 October,  2008 

Authoritative account of the conspiracy by Slobodan Milošević,  Borisav Jović and Veljko Kadijević to break up the
former Yugoslavia and carve out a Great Serbia 



Part I – We pretend to resist their pretended secession
 
Serbs do not prize the truth.  It is thought here  that to rely on
the truth,  and to depend on it,   is to be naive,  stupid and weak.
Sreten Ugričić
 
‘The wars of the 1990s on the territory of the former Yugoslavia were caused by separatist efforts on the part of
Slovenia,  Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina unconstitutionally to separate from Yugoslavia,  which the SFRY Presidency
tried to prevent by use of the JNA’s military power ,  in order to protect the country’s constitutional order and
territorial integrity.’ 

This more or less is the basic argument of Milošević’s propaganda,  which he used from time to time to justify his
actions. This argument also formed the basis of his defence before the Hague tribunal. Lastly,  this argument is a monumental
falsity,  the parapet behind which Serb nationalism hides to this very day: hailing Karadžić and Mladić as heroes,
because they were only defending the Serb people,  which the separatists were attempting to wrench from the Serbian
motherland; and insisting on the assertion that Serbia was not involved in the war,  and that the conflict was in the
nature of a spontaneously created civil war in which the JNA was merely trying to separate the warring parties and protect
the people.
The falsity of this thesis can best be proved by a thought experiment in which we assume that the SFRY managed to survive
(let’s say through an outside military intervention,  something that according to his own testimony in the BBC programme
The Death of Yugoslavia Karadžić greatly feared). In the context of such an experiment,  the role and activities of
Slobodan Milošević,  Borisav Jović and Veljko Kadijević (as well as many others who implemented their orders) would
have qualified according to the laws of that very same SFRY as high treason punishable by death.

The thought experiment that we propose is to formulate the elements of the indictment according to which Milošević,
Jović and Kadijević would have been tried in a Yugoslav court,  in accordance with the Yugoslav laws then valid, 
had they not succeeded in destroying the SFRY.
The charge against them would have included the following:

Slobodan Milošević,  in his capacity as President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists
of Serbia (before 16 July 1990) ,  President of the Socialist Party of Serbia (from 16 July 1990),  and President of
the Republic of Serbia (from 9 December 1990),

Borisav Jović,  in his capacity as President of the Presidency of the SFRY  (from 15 May 1989) and Vice-President of
the Socialist Party of Serbia (from 16 July 1990),  and

Veljko Kadijević,  in his capacity as Federal Secretary for National Defence in the period  from 15 May 1989 to 8 October
1992

formed a conspiracy in order,  by abusing their political authority,

1. unconstitutionally and illegally to alter the national composition of the JNA,  place the JNA under their effective
control,  and use it in the pursuit of the following aims:
2. forcibly to overthrow the governments of Slovenia and Croatia;
3. forcibly to overthrow by a military coup the highest federal governmental bodies - the Federal Executive Council
([Savezno izvršno v(ij)eče or] SIV) and the Presidency;
4. forcibly or by unconstitutional means to alter the borders of the SFRY,  by excluding the Republic of Slovenia and
the Republic of Croatia from the SFRY  by an unconstitutional order  of the Presidency;
5. forcibly or by unconstitutional means to change the borders of the Republic of Croatia,  by instigating,  and politically
and militarily organising,  an armed rebellion in Croatia;
which caused the death of a large number of people,  placed human lives in danger,  and was accompanied by great acts
of violence and extensive destruction;

and by so doing they each individually,  and collectively together,  committed an extended criminal act  on the basis
of Article 136,  § 1,  and of Article 116,  §§ 1. and.2,. in the most serious forms,  punishable by Article 139 of
the Criminal Code (Official SFRY Journal,  no. 44/76).

The criminal acts cited contain the following dispositions:

Article 136 says:
1. Whoever creates a conspiracy,  circle,  group or other association of persons for the purpose of perpetrating criminal
acts  as defined by articles 114 to 119,  § 2.,  Articles 120 to 123,  Articles 125 to 127 and Articles 131 to 132
of this law,  or who creates a group for the purpose of moving or directing the citizens of the SFRY abroad to commit
hostile activities against the SFRY,  will be punished by imprisonment for no less than five years.

Article 116 says:
1. Whoever commits an act designed forcibly or unconstitutionally to separate part of the SFRY’s territory,  or to
add part of this territory to another state,  will be punished by imprisonment  of not less than five years.
2. Whoever commits and act designed forcibly or unconstitutionally to alter the borders between the republics and the
autonomous provinces  will be punished by imprisonment  of no less than one year.
Article 116 incriminates as an autonomous action  preparatory activity and attempting to change borders. 

Article 139 says:
For committing a criminal act - according to Article 114,  Article 115 § 1,  Articles 116 to 121,  Articles 123 to
128,  Article 132,  and Article 136 § 1. of this law - that causes the death of some person,  or places human life
in danger,  or is accompanied by great violence and extensive destruction,  or has endangered the security,  economic
and military capacity of the country - or in other exceptionally grave cases  - the perpetrator will be punished by
imprisonment of no less than ten years  or by death,

Article 118, § 3. determines what is considered preparatory activity in the case of such actions.
Article 118, § 3 says:

When the law prescribes punishment  for the preparation of a certain criminal act,  the preparation may consist of acquisition
or activation of the means for execution of the criminal act,  removal of obstacles to the execution of the criminal
act,  negotiations,  planning and organising with others  to commit the criminal act,  as well as other activities serving
to create the conditions for immediate execution of the criminal act,  but which do not represent the act of execution.
The facts pointing to the execution of this act are based almost exclusively on Borisav Jović’s diary,  published
under the title Poslednji dani SFRJ  [“The Last Days of the SFRY”,  (Belgrade,  Politika 1995),  and Veljko Kadijević’s
memoirs Moje viđenje raspada - vojska bez države  [“My View of the Break-Up - an army without a state”] (Belgrade:
Politika 1993).
The credibility of the facts which these contain,  and which relate to the creation of a conspiracy,  derives 

(a) from the essential concordance of their testimonies; 
(b) from the fact that they testify to their own actions; as well as 
(c) from the fact that one cannot conceive of a credible motive  for their own [false] self-incrimination.

In addition,  not only did Milošević never deny  the claims by Jović and Kadijević,  but their books were also published
by the Politika publishing company  over which Milošević had full control.
It is true that,  at his trial in The Hague,  Milošević denied during the hearing of the witness Stjepan Mesić  that
he had ever read Jović’s book.  This assertion is contested,  however,  by Miodrag Marović in his book Politika
i istina [“Politics and the Truth”] (Belgrade: Helsinški Committee for Human Rights 2002,  p.331):  ‘Mihajlo
Marković said – and the media published-- that Milošević had handled Jović’s manuscript.’
Finally,  the plans and intentions of the conspirators,  as they themselves describe them,  were concretely realised
during the subsequent political and military events.

Let us now turn to the activities by means of which they accomplished certain essential elements of these criminal acts.
The Conspiracy

Independently of the criminal aims of the conspiracy,  the trio’s very modus operandi points to the conspiratorial-subversive
nature of their activity. 
This took place through overstepping of their authority;  execution of criminal acts in abuse of their office;  acting
outside the legal institutions or bodies to which they belonged and unbeknownst to such institutions. 
The fact that Milošević,  Jović and Kadijević acted in this manner can be seen from the following notes made by
Borislav Jović:
In the first paragraph of his book,  Jović describes his becoming President of the Presidemcy of the SFRY on 15 May
1989:

‘Slobodan Milošević is sitting behind me. He tells me loudly: "Boro,  I am behind you". I replied equally emphatically:
"I am counting on it".’ 
(Borislav Jović  Posljednji dani SFRJ,  p.7).

A year later,  in April 1990,  Jović writes:

‘It turns out that the manner in which we timed our further work  was good,  because the main things will occur in
the [military] Council  while I am its president,  and in the Presidency when I become its president.  It is clear that
it could not be done otherwise.’ 
(BJ,139)

During this same meeting  Kadijević tells Jović of his plans that 

‘The SIV [the federal government]  must be placed  under the control of the [federal state] Presidency’;  

that the JNA had made plans 

‘that in all crucial parts of the country,  above all in Slovenia and Croatia,  they have ensured that they can assume
full control in the shortest time possible’; 

and that he was aware that they 

‘can not win the whole Presidency for this,  but can have the majority’ 
(BJ,  142).

This is how Kadijević describes the nature of this meeting: 

‘He insists that our meeting and talk are more important than any other meetings or talks one could have today in
our country,  nor are there bodies where we could discuss this.’ 
(BJ,  139).

Jović notes in another place: 

‘Veljko is in the habit of giving me these analyses,  which for understandable reasons he cannot put before the whole
Presidency’ 
(BJ,  68).

During a conversation between Kadijević and Jović on 10 August 1990,  the two agreed:
‘We believe that the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis  should happen while I am at the head of the SFRY Presidency.
We would be totally powerless after that. This is why me must make the moves that lead towards it. 
(BJ,  176)

On another occasion,  on 26 January 1991,  Jović describes his telephone conversation with Milošević:

‘He is very disappointed with the results of the meeting of the Presidency. It does not fit into his plan (schema),
"about which we cannot talk on the phone". 
Because,  he says,  once the army has finally covered the Serb territories in Croatia,  we [who? - SP] shall no longer
dread the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.  This is the only way.  Slobodan still clings onto what might have been
possible  until recently,  but which the army refused - that we "cut them off" from Yugoslavia.’ 
(BJ,  262)

It is clear from this  that the conversations held between Milošević,  Jović and Kadijević are of a conspiratorial
nature. These conversations

- are conducted outside and hidden from the institutions to which they belong  (the federal Presidency,  the federal
government);
- cannot be conducted by telephone;
- deal with matters that cannot be discussed in the institutions;
- are more important to the interlocutors than those they can conduct in any other
institution of the state;
- use systematically the pronoun ‘we’ in an undefinable manner which the interlocutors nevertheless understand.
These are the formal forms of a conspiracy,  especially bearing in mind the importance of the interlocutors’ positions
- President of the Presidency,  President of the Republic of Serbia,  minister of defence - irrespective of whether
we know anything about the subject of their conversations.



The structure of the conspiracy

The trio Milošević-Jović-Kadijević  formed the core of the conspiracy. 
Milošević brought to the conspiracy his enormous popularity among the Serbs (in Serbia,  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia),
and in particular his power over the street  (rallies at which legal governments were brought down);  
Jović his position as President of the Presidency and supreme military commander;  
Kadijević his office as federal secretary of National Defence (which together with the Presidency forms the supreme
command ).  

Their motivations,  aims and chosen means for realising these aims did not always and in everything coincide.
Kadijević saw his aim as the preservation of socialism and a centralised Yugoslavia - as an aim in its own right, 
but also as protection against anti-Communist revanchism. Jović quotes Kadijević:
‘The [Communist] bloc has collapsed. In a word,  everything is uncertain. Veljko is worried even about our own safety,
should retrograde processes occur in the USSR.’ 
(BJ,  49).

‘... what is worse for us is that he [Gorbachev - SP] has damaged the balance of power in Europe and indicted all
Communists. We must defend ourselves now.’ 
(BJ,  108).

‘The army must be clear about what will happen in our region in the long run,  but we must survive as a state of socialist
orientation.’ 
(BJ,  68)

‘Veljko is totally disappointed. He says that many Communists are frightened by the anti-Communist offensive. They
do not fight back,  do not react,  as if they did not care about what is happening.’ 
(BJ,  94)

‘He believes that the advancing anti-Communist forces threaten retribution,  and that if we do not do anything substantial
to prevent their advance,  there will follow a revanchism of the worst kind - we shall be hanged from the lamp posts
just like that.’ (BJ,  91-2)

‘Veljko himself believes that if the right-wing and revanchist forces win [the elections - SP],  then we shall be
in a position (because everything is unconstitutional) to remove them by force. Force remains as a possibility.’ 
(BJ,  138)

Jović shared with Kadijević the aim of preserving socialism,  but gave up the idea of preserving Yugoslavia sooner
than he did  (something that he and Milošević hid from Kadijević,  the better to make use of him).
Jović thus notes on 6 April 1990: 

‘Veljko Kadijević ... suggests that the SFRY Presidency ask the Constitutional Court to declare unconstitutional
the multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia.  As if this could be done!’
(BJ,  136)

‘Veljko Kadijević is confused and disappointed by the decision of the Serbian leadership to go for a Socialist Party
... He thinks that the Serbs should have kept the Communist name.’ 
(BJ,  152)  
(Milošević’s wife subsequently formed the Communists for Yugoslavia party.)

29 January 1991: 

‘[Kadijević] has not as yet swallowed the fact that he should defend the Serb territories in Croatia. He still believes
in defending Yugoslavia.’ 
(BJ,  264)

27 June 1991: 
‘Slobodan and I  are with Kadijević... Slobodan repeats several times  (correcting yesterday’s mistake)  that the
army should defend Yugoslavia’s future borders.
 
"Why should we defend Slovenia’s border,  which can only be temporary? *We should defend what will last".’ 
(BJ,  343)

Milošević,  for his part,  had the aim of consolidating and enlarging his power; with that aim in mind,  he temporarily
adopted  various programmes,  various partners and various aims  (a centralised Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia,  a truncated
Yugoslavia without Slovenia and Croatia,  a Great Serbia). 
He defended socialism 

(a) to the extent that it secured him the support of the party and state apparatus and the army (whose own interests
were threatened by the change); 
(b) insofar as it allowed him control over the economy and the state media (the state was practically the sole employer
under socialism).

Of the three,  Milošević was the first to decide to solve relations in Yugoslavia by force. Jović and Kadijević
believed for a long time that a threat of force would be enough.
Once they had agreed to use force (the coup d’état planned for mid March 1991),  they tried to outmaneuvre each other
over who would take the blame. 
Milošević and Jović tried to make Kadijević responsible for it. 
Kadijević hesitated,  and in the end did not dare to go for a pure military coup.
Jović notes on 13 March 1991: 

‘Having listened to Veljko,  I told him that I would resign tomorrow after the meeting... I’ll give the army space
to act.’ 
(BJ,  296)

When Kadijević’s nerve failed,  Jović wrote: 

‘They were not true either to me or to Slobodan,  and wanted us to give them political cover.’ 
(BJ,  310)

Kadijević in time would agree to use the army  without a legal decision by the Presidency,  i.e.  to follow the orders
of at least 

‘a group of members of the Presidency,  though they do not form a qualified majority’. (BJ,  162)

It took Jović,  on the other hand,  a long time to grasp the fact that,  by adopting  [in September 1990] a constitution
that made Serbia  an independent state (‘which is not at war’),  Milošević had formally placed the main responsibility
for use of the army on the [rump] Presidency and Jović  (even though Milošević,  as the most important member of
the ‘group of six’,  did play a decisive role  in the making of military decisions.)

Milošević’s main contribution to the conspiracy’s activity consisted in his rejection of political means,  his
readiness to use force to realise the conspiracy’s aims,  and his complete contempt for any legal order.

Jović was more diffident in this regard,  and at first made mild objections to some of Milošević’s violent acts
that provoked or fostered conflicts in the SFRY. 
Thus,  for example,  he criticised the suspension of economic relations  with Slovenia  (BJ,  78),  the holding of the
so-called Truth Rally in Ljubljana (BJ,  78),  the undermining of Ante Marković’s anti-inflation plan (BJ,  85),
the attack on the monetary system (BJ,  241). But when faced with a fait accompli,  he would in the end comply.

The conspiracy was subsequently joined by others  (let us say ‘the group of six’,  which in addition to Milošević,
Jović and Kadijević  included also Blagoje Adžić [the JNA Chief of Staff],  Momir Bulatović [then President of
Montenegro]  and Branko Kostić [the pseudo-President of the rump Yugoslav pseudo-Presidency  after Stipe Mesić’s
resignation on 6 December 1991],  followed by [Milan] Babić,  [Milan Martić,  [Radovan] Karadžić,  [Nikola] Koljević,
[Momčilo] Krajišnik,  [Ratko] Mladić - BJ 371,  382-7,  391-2). 
But during the most important period of the start of the wars  in the former Yugoslavia,  the decisive role was played
by the trio  Milošević-Jović-Kadijević.


A plea for lawlessness

Nevertheless,  the motor of the conspiracy was Slobodan Milošević,  who advocated violent methods  as early as the
start of 1989,  at the 20th session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,  when he publicly
made his ‘plea for lawlessness’.
On that occasion,  carried along by the eruption of militant nationalism among the Serbs,  he motivated before his colleagues
- the representatives of the other republics - his readiness to abuse his position and act illegally and to use all
available means in this way:

‘In places  [meaning,  according to the contemporary jargon,  ‘in the republics’ - SP] and with respect to problems
where the absence of sentiment for change  has been greatest,  and where it has not been possible to do anything  in
the normal way,  through the institutions,  yet things have to be changed  because the people find them intolerable
and they have gone on too long,  they must be changed extra-institutionally.’

Further: 

‘But the solution will not be found through procedure,  its small and large snares,  its small and large craftiness,
intrigues and tricks.  It will be arrived at through a policy endorsed by the majority of the people of this land, 
institutionally and extra-institutionally,  through the statutes and outside of them,  in the streets and off them,
in a populist and an elitist manner,  through argument and without argument,  but in any case  in such a way  that it
becomes clear  that it is a policy for Yugoslavia,  in which people will live as one,  as equals,  in a richer and more
cultured fashion.’ 
(Dragoš Ivanović,  Bolest vladanja [“The Sickness of Rule”],  
Belgrade: Republika, 2000,  p. 39)

In an interview with NIN on 12 April 1991,  he went on to explain what his ‘extra-institutional solutions’ would
be like:

‘We must achieve unity,  if as the largest and most populous republic  we wish to dictate the course of events in
the future.  It is a question of frontiers - essential matters of state. And as you know  frontiers are always drawn
by the strong,  never by the weak.... 
I have ordered mobilisation of the police reserve.  We are further engaged in the creation of additional police forces,
while the government has been entrusted with the task of preparing the relevant formations which will make us secure
in any event: i.e. enable us to defend the interests of our republic,  and of the Serb people outside Serbia... 
If we have to fight,  then by God we will fight.  I hope,  however,  that they will not be so crazy as to fight us.
For if we are not good at working and producing,  at least we shall be good at fighting.’


Continuity of the conspiratorial mode of government

As may also be relevant here,  this conspiratorial system of government (outside institutions,  outside regular lines
of decision-making,  by way of the streets,  by violence) remained the dominant feature of Slobodan Milošević’s
regime until the end of his rule. 
Here are some striking examples:

1. ‘In the autumn of 1992,  during a rainy night,  members of the pro-Milošević [Serbian] republican police  seized
in a surprise attack  the building of the federal police,  which was then outside their control (this was at the time
when Dobrica Ćosić was federal [FRY] president  and Milan Panić  federal prime minister). Neither the parliament
nor any other state body made any protest against this unprecedented transgression.’ 
(Dragoš Ivanović,  pp. 41-2).

2. ‘The government conducted  what was undoubtedly its greatest plundering offensive against its own people in 1993
with a planned stoking of inflation.  This was designed to finance a continuation of the war,  i.e. state expenditure
outside public control. 
The value of the dinar  fell day by day.  In the second half of the year,  inflation acquired a galloping tempo,  turning
everything into a desert ... 
At the end of 1993,  one German mark was worth one billion dinars  on the black market... 
In January 1994,  when it suited it,  the state arrested this inflational typhoon,  which had reached a fantastic 313
million per cent,  through a monetary reform.’ (Dragoš Ivanović,  p. 47) 
In January 1994,  ‘prices rose on average 62 per cent per day,  2 per cent per hour and 0.029 per minute’ 
(Mlađan Dinkić,  Ekonomija destrukcije [The Economy of Destruction],  
Belgrade 1995,  p.43).

3. The next example might be the proven electoral fraud in 1994,  which led to three months of protest by Serbian citizens
and ended with the adoption of the so-called lex specialis,  that recognised the electoral fraud de facto but without
calling anyone to account. (Lex,  whistles and lies’,  Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava,  Belgrade 1997,  p.322).
4. On the eve of the presidential elections in 2000,  elections that Milošević would lose,  there were three assassination
attempts  against two potential anti-Milošević candidates  (Vuk Drašković,  Ivan Stambolić),  during which  four
people died. It was established that the political police  had kept both  under strict observation  until immediately
prior to the attacks 
(Dragoljub Todorović,  ‘Razlozi za konstituisanje’ [Reasons for constitution-making],  Srpska reč,  no. 297, 
5 June 2002).

5. The next example might be Milošević’s refusal  to recognise the results of the 2000 presidential elections, 
and his readiness to use the army  to prevent a legal change of government. 

‘Did the former Yugoslav [FRY] president call you  during the evening [of 5 October 2000 - SP]?’,  a journalist
from Glas  asked the chief of staff of the Yugoslav [FRY] army (VJ),  
Nebojša Pavković,  who replied: ‘--Yes. He called me at around 23 hours,  in connection with the events at Studio
B [radio station].  Obviously the Studio B programme was very provocative.  I told him  that there were people there,
and that it was not the duty of the VJ  to fire at its own people,  and that it was not a military but a police problem.’
(Glas,  13 December 2000,  p.13).

6. The testimony of [state security service chief] Rade Marković before the Hague tribunal shows that Milošević treated
money belonging to the state budget (i.e. customs revenue) as his own,  which allowed him to pay in cash anyone he wanted
and the sums he wanted ( Tribunal archives concerning Milošević’s case). This was made possible only by the conspiratorial
nature of government and complete contempt for any legal order.


Undermining the Federal Government - taking control of the Federal Presidency

In order to realise their aims,  the plotters had to destroy or take control  of the federal institutions of government
that stood between them  and the JNA. Kadijević,  for example,  was responsible both to the federal presidency as supreme
commander  and to the federal government  of which he was a member.
The plotters acquired a majority on the SFRY presidency  by relatively simple means. 

First,  through Milošević’s agreement with Slovenia’s president,  Milan Kučan,  on 24 January 1991  that Slovenia
could leave Yugoslavia unhindered;  and 

secondly through the anti-constitutional election on 10 May 1991  of the Kosovo representative on the presidency  (he
was elected by the Serbian assembly,  rather than –as Article 321 of the SFRY constitution prescribed-- by the Kosovo
assembly).

However,  for Kadijević to have a free hand  to act in line  with the plotters’ aims,  it was necessary to liberate
him  also from another politically superior institution:  the federal government (SIV). Only by achieving this would
they be able to ‘dictate the future course of events’ (Milošević).

Accordingly they not only acted behind the back of the legitimate government,  but also tried to sabotage that government,
to bring it down or place it under their control.
This is what Jović says about it:

‘"Coordination" in the Serbian presidency [office]. Conference on what should be done... [Serbian prime minister]
Stanko Radmilović gives initial information... Sloba [Milošević] remains silent,  waiting. Only [chairman of the
central committee of the Serbian League of Communists] Bogdan [Trifunović] says that we are being left in the lurch,
because everyone else supports the SIV.’ (BJ,  87).

A conversation between Kadijević and Jović on 26 April 1990. 

Kadijević says: ‘the SIV must be placed under the control of the [federal] presidency.’ (BJ,  142)
Milošević tells Jović: 

‘--We must bring him ([federal premier] Ante Marković) down. If he were to survive now,  he would remain another
four years,  and we don’t have confidence in him(Ante)’. (BJ,  82)
‘We spend the whole day on the boat and the sea (on Mljet) - the excursion party: Veljko,  Sloba,  Bogdan (Trifunović)
and I with our families.... We all agree that Ante Marković is no longer acceptable to us and that we don’t trust
him. We are all convinced now that he is simply a US agent,  instructed to bring down the system  and remove from power
all those who think of socialism... Veljko calls him a "son of a whore".’ (BJ,  176)
‘I have written a series of three articles "The Truth about Ante Marković" and sent them to Slobodan. He sent them
for publication to Politika. They will serialise it on 5,  6 and 7 under a pseudonym. We must expose him,  because the
people are deeply mistaken about who and what he is. Many view him as a saviour.’ (BJ,  173)
‘Veljko Kadijević informs me about the preparations for the arrests in Croatia... asks whether they should formally
inform me and Ante Marković before or after the arrests ... we agreed that Ante need not be formally informed,  because
he could make trouble.’ (BJ,  227-8)
‘SIV has today announced a meeting [in response to Jović’s resignation from the presidency and Milošević’s
declaration that "Yugoslavia no longer exists" - SP] with the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defence] collegium,
which the army rejected. No one will attend the meeting.’ (BJ,  308)
‘Kadijević tells me about his talk with [Soviet defence minister] Yazov.  A few days ago (by telephone)  he put clear
questions to Yazov about whether the USSR could protect us  in the event of a Western military intervention,  and whether
it could sell us certain matériel  that we lack (bombs and kerosene).  The answer was negative on both accounts.  More
precisely,  they could not protect us,  and as for the matériel - only through regular channels,  by way of the SFRY
government  (but we are seeking to bypass the government,  because Ante Marković is preventing the government from
acting).’ (BJ,  360)


The Serbian constitution

The decisive blow against the [federal] government  (and the SFRY state,  which Milošević ‘is only formally supporting’)
(BJ,  159)  was delivered,  however,  by Milošević with the new Serbian constitution adopted on 28 September 1990.
Jović notes on 29 March 1990:

 ‘Meeting for "coordination" in the [offices of] SR Serbia. All leading officials are present. Our aim is to avoid
bloodshed,  and to establish a frontier  within which there will be no war. Outside that frontier  war cannot be avoided,
because Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot survive as a state and it is impossible to conceive a battle over territory without
bloodshed.’ (BJ,  131)

Jović further notes on 30 July 1990: 

‘I speak on the telephone ... with Slobodan Milošević. I make the point that the Serbian constitutional draft  does
not state clearly  that Serbia recognises and respects the SFRY constitution....  He reassures me that this should be
easy,  that it will be added immediately,  though I have had to tell him three times to do so.’ (BJ,  173)

This shows that Milošević was the true author of the Serbian constitution.

According to Article 135 § 2 of the new Serbian constitution: 

‘When acts of the federal organs  or acts of the organs of another republic  violate the equal status of the Republic
of Serbia,  in respect of the rights and duties that it enjoys under the SFRY constitution,  or when its interests are
threatened  in some other way without securing compensation,  the [Serbian] republican organs introduce acts  to protect
the interests of the Republic of Serbia.’


Application of the constitution - the legislature

That these provisions were not adopted only ‘on paper’ is testified to by the busy legislative activity of the Serbian
assembly,  which derogated federal laws  and usurped existing powers of the federation. Here are some examples:

1. On the basis of this provision,  the Serbian assembly adopted a law  for a special tax on trade in goods and services
of specified origin,  and for special taxes  (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia,  no. 6/90,  p.151) which,
in Article 1,  envisaged:

‘Trade in services of a specified origin is subject to a special tax on trade in goods and services. The special tax
is paid on establishment of a firm,  use of business space and building land.’

Goods and services of specified origin,  in the sense of this law,  refer to ‘goods produced,  or services supplied
by legal persons and active individuals located or residing on the territory of another republic that fails to implement
assumed obligations,  or refuses to participate in the establishment or implementation  of a policy of even-handed development
of an agrarian policy  in the interest of the whole country,  or places the Republic of Serbia in some other way in
a position of inequality.’

Article 2 § 1 envisaged: 

‘The executive council [government] of the Republic of Serbia decides which goods and services,  or legal persons
and active individuals located or residing on the territory of another republic,  are liable to payment of a special
tax on trade in services and goods,  and to special taxes.’ 

And,  according to Article 8: 

‘Revenue realised in accordance with this law is paid into a separate account of the Republic of Serbia.’


2. A law on changes and additions to the law  on social control of prices (Official Gazette of the RoS,  no. 6/90, 
p. 151)  was also brought in  on 23 October 1990,  through application of the same provision of the Serbian constitution;
this introduced a new Article 7 saying:

‘In exceptional cases  when acts of the federal organs  or acts of the organs of other republics infringe in the domain
of prices  the equality of companies  in regard to the conditions of production,  or endanger in some other way  the
economic interest of the Republic without securing compensation,  the executive council [government]  may prescribe
measures of direct control of prices,  and other measures for goods and services which are specified by federal law
as products and services of interest for the whole country.’

3. Application of the same provision of the Serbian constitution  led to the adoption also of a law on trade in goods
(Official Gazette of the RoS ,  no. 6/90,  p. 153),  which introduced a new Article 34a according to which: ‘Companies
and other legal subjects may issue purchasing credits to citizens for goods produced on the territory of the Republic
of Serbia.’

4. Application of the same constitutional provision led to the adoption also of a law on incurring debts and issuing
guarantees and super-guarantees on specified foreign credits on the part of the Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette
of the RoS ,  no. 6/90,  p. 153),  Article 1 of which says:

‘The Republic of Serbia may take financial and other credits abroad for the sake of maintaining current liquidity
in payments abroad,  for productive and property restructuring,  for carrying out investment activities abroad,  and
for other purposes that are in harmony with the policy and developmental plan of the Republic.’

And its Article 4 says: 

‘The executive committee of the Serbian assembly decides on the indebtedness of the Republic,  and on the issuing
of guarantees and super-guarantees up to ten million US dollars.’

And in Article 5: 

‘The National Bank of Serbia conducts all business and documentation on incurring debt abroad.’

5. The same provision of the Serbian constitution  led to adoption  of a law on the measures that may be taken  in order
to prevent distortions in production,  trade and development in the Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette of the RoS
,  no. 6/90,  p. 155),  whose Article 2 envisaged:

‘The executive council of the Republic of Serbia  may provisionally: prescribe the obligation that part of the revenue
derived from the basic tax on trade in goods and services  that belongs to the federation,  as well as part of the outstanding
customs duties  and other import taxes,  should be paid into a separate account of the Republic of Serbia  during a
period in which organs of the federation  are not implementing assumed obligations towards the Republic of Serbia, 
and when there is a failure to establish or implement an economic policy for which the federation is responsible,  thereby
threatening the economic interests of the Republic of Serbia.’

6. Predrag Tašić,  the spokesman for the SIV [the federal government],  describes in the chapter ‘The Serbian pillage
of the decade’ of his book Kako sam branio Antu Markovića (“Defending Ante Marković”,  NIP Mugri 21,  Skopje
1993)  the ‘attack on the monetary system’ when Serbia ‘borrowed’ illegally $1.4 billion from the primary emission:
‘On 28 December [990],  at the time when Ante Marković was speaking in the Yugoslav assembly  about next year’s
economic policy,  the Council of Associated Labour of the Serbian assembly  adopted two legal acts that attacked  the
Yugoslav monetary system. Both these acts were adopted in secret.  They were marked "strictly confidential"  and "official
secret".  
They were distributed to delegates  on the very day of the session,  thrust into the hands of each in an envelope. 
Following their adoption  (and they were adopted unanimously and without discussion),  the delegates had to place them
back into the envelope  and return them.  These provisions of the Republic of Serbia  gave it the right to an additional
18.243 billion dinars (or $1.4 billion).’ 
(Predrag Tašić,  p. 57).

‘To make it possible this time to take more money in one go,  his [Milošević’s - SP] man at the National Bank
of Yugoslavia  proposed that it be "legalised" by the Republic of Serbia borrowing from the National Bank of Serbia,
with appropriate provisions being adopted by the Serbian assembly! The money would not be taken,  of course,  from the
National Bank of Serbia,  but from the National Bank of Yugoslavia!’ (P. Tašić,  p.58)

‘On 4 January 1991 Ante Marković was anonymously informed of the Serbian attack on the monetary system’ (P. Tašić,
p.59) 

According to Tašić,  at an emergency meeting  of the [federal] government Ante Marković called this act  ‘the act
of liquidation of Yugoslavia’. (P. Tašić,  p.59)

This is how Jović describes these events: 5 January 1991: 

‘Serbia has borrowed (decided to borrow) from the National Bank of Serbia  [see Tašić,  p.58 above] 18.2 billion
dinars  from the primary emission for the payment of pensions... Marendić,  a Croatian member of the SIV,  asked that
those responsible in Serbia be arrested,  and was supported by Aca Mitrović and by Ante (Marković),  of course,  but
the SIV was divided. It was decided that the matter be investigated and the money returned. ... 
I called Slobodan and told him. Ante Marković had already called him. Sloba knows everything,  but minimises the problem.’
(BJ,  239)

He continues on 8 January 1991: 

‘Conversation with [Serbian premier - SP] Stanko Radmilović.... I criticised him a little on account of what they
did  in regard to the emission,  and with revenues belonging to the federation. He tells me that they would certainly
have lost the elections  without it,  because half of the republic  would have been left  without salaries or pensions.
Ante (Marković) was wondering aloud how we were managing to avoid "bankruptcy",  and we got the better of him. That’s
the point.’ (BJ,  241)


Unconstitutionality

The activity of the plotters  as described above – 

1. sabotaging and undermining the SIV; 
2. adopting the Republic of Serbia’s constitution; and 
3. using Republic of Serbia laws  to derogate federal law – 

was against the SFRY constitution (and led politically to the federation’s break-up).

1. ‘Placing SIV under the [federal] presidency’s control’
According to Article 347 § 9 of the SFRY constitution:

‘The Federal Executive Council [SIV]... harmonises and directs the work  of the federal administrative organs  for
the purpose of securing the policy  and implementation of the laws,  other provisions and general acts of the SFRY assembly;
supervises the work of the federal administrative organs,  and suspends provisions of federal administrative organs
that contradict federal law,  other provisions or general acts of the SFRY assembly,  or any provision it has itself
adopted  for the purpose of implementation of federal law,  other provisions or general acts; and may annul the provisions
of those organs,  under conditions established by federal law.’

Kadijević,  therefore,  found himself constitutionally under the supervision of the federal government  and the federal
prime minister,  Ante Marković,  who directed his work.
As for the president of the federal presidency,  Jović,  in the event of his disagreeing with the federal prime minister,
as a member of the presidency  he had the right and the obligation  to bring the contested issues  to arbitration  by
the federal assembly. 
According to Article 329 § 3 and 4 of the SFRY constitution: 

‘The SFRY presidency has the right to delay the execution of SIV regulations of a general political nature before
their announcement.’ 
‘If the SFRY presidency delays the execution of a SIV regulation,  it will bring the contested issue before the appropriate
council of the SFRY assembly for a decision.’

The idea of placing the [federal] government  under the control of the [federal] presidency is also unconstitutional:
‘The SFRY presidency does not have a hierarchical but a constitutionally determined and restricted relationship  vis-à
-vis the federal executive council.’
(According to Prof. Jovan Đorđević,  Constitutional Law,  
Savremena administracija,  Belgrade 1982).


Constitution of the Republic of Serbia

The provisions of the Serbian constitution [of 1990 were] contrary,  of course,  to the provisions of the SFRY constitution.
Thus,  for example,  it usurp[ed] three basic powers of the federation: 

in international relations (Art. 281 § 7 of the SFRY constitution),  
national defence (Art. 281 § 6 ) 
and state security (Art. 281 § 8). 

It [did] so with the provisions contained in articles 

72 § 1. (‘The Republic of Serbia determines and ensures ... relations with other states and international organisations)
and
73 § 3. (‘The Republic of Serbia regulates and ensures ... the defence and security of the Republic of Serbia and
its citizens.’)

Even more importantly,  by virtue of Article 135 § 2.  of the republic’s constitution Serbia literally exempted itself
from the SFRY’s legal system,  because of the provision that it would ‘respect’ federal laws only when that was
in its interest. 
This clause is known in law as  si volam (if I wish),  and its effect is wholly to annul every obligation entered into
upon this condition. Which is perfectly logical: the function of a legal obligation is to limit the will of the one
who accepts it. If the clause envisages that the will of the one bound  has primacy over the bond,  then the obligation
does not exist.

What is most important,  however,  is that the Serbian constitution of 28 September 1990 is a separatist constitution.
(It was adopted over a year before the Slovenian and Croatian proclamations of independence  on 8 October 1991.)

Article 72 specifies that Serbia is sovereign and independent:

‘The Republic of Serbia regulates and ensures: 

1. The sovereignty,  independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia,  and its international position
and relations with other states and international bodies...’

With this provision,  Serbia ceased to be a member of the federation: it became an independent state,  without any obligations
towards the federation,  a member of which it no longer was.
If this is so,  and it is,  then one should question the meaning of the provision of Article 135 § 1 of the Serbian
constitution,  which says:

‘The rights and duties which the Republic of Serbia,  which is part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
has in accordance with this constitution,  and which according to the federal constitution  are realised in the federation,
will be realised in accordance with the federal constitution.’

The meaning of this provision  is that the independent Serbia,  which has no obligations towards the federation,  wishes
to retain those rights that the federal constitution gave it when it was a member of the federation. The most important
of these rights (which Serbia had in fact legally given up  with its independence) are: 

1. to participate in the work of the presidency of a state to which it no longer belonged; 
2. to use the latter to retain control of the army; 
3. to hide behind the Yugoslav name and ‘advocate Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity’; and 
4. to claim the ‘right’ to a part of the federal cash box.

The meaning of the expression  that the independent Republic of Serbia  was ‘part of the SFRY’ can be understood
only  as a claim devoid of all legal basis  to continue to execute the rights which it used to enjoy  as a member of
the federation,  even after it had constituted itself as an independent state,  without having any obligations towards
the SFRY.
(How and why the other republics agreed  (while they did agree)  to accept this situation,  in which Serbia ‘exercised
its rights’ in the federation without having any obligations towards it  (and to which  as an independent state  it
did not belong),  can be understood only in light of the fact  that Serbia controlled the army,  and persistently threatened
with it: i.e. only because of their fear of war,  and desire somehow to avoid it.)
At the same time,  this independent state,  being ‘part of the SFRY’,  managed to enter the monetary system of another
state (SFRY) and ‘borrow’ $1.4 billion unilaterally from its primary emission!

Croatia adopted a [new] constitution after the adoption of the Serbian one, and modelled upon it. The following exchange
took place between the Serbian representative on the federal Presidency Borisav Jović, the Croatian representative
on the Presidency Stjepan Mesić, and the federal premier Ante Marković , at the 125th session of the SFRY Presidency:
Borisav Jović: Why did you not propose that the Croatian constitution, which endangers the rights of the Serb people,
be annulled? You should go one step further. 
Ante Marković: We have asked that the implementation of all these decisions should be suspended for three months. 
Stjepan Mesić: But what is the problem with the Croatian constitution? 
Ante Marković: I don’t know. I don’t want to speak about it right now. 
Stjepan Mesić: Croatia has written down exactly what Serbia has written down. We have deliberately copied it, knowing
that they would attack it. I said: ‘Write down what Serbia has written down and don’t worry - Bora Jović will attack
it.’ But it’s not his fault. I know whose fault it is. 
Borisav Jović: It’s the person you were quoting. What I was just reading - you’re referring to him. 
Stjepan Mesić: I don’t know, if you dare to say so. 
(Stenographic records of the 125th session of the Presidency of 12 July 1991.)
  

Implementation of the constitution (legislature)

In perfect accordance with its status as an independent state, the Republic of Serbia makes its own laws, with which
it regulates the relations that were once the prerogative of the federation: it introduces new taxes on goods from abroad
(i.e. the Yugoslav republics), decides on its own credit policy, collects taxes on the new state borders which it pays
into its own account, determines its own price policy , etc. All this would not be possible under the provision of Article
281 §1, points 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 of the SFRY constitution.


Alteration of the national structure of the JNA/Unconstitutional command over the JNA/Unconstitutional use of the JNA
The army’s multinational composition represented the next obstacle to effective command over and use of the JNA, for
the aims of destroying and remaking Yugoslavia - aims that were 100 percent contrary to its constitutional function.
This is why they tried, by abusing their positions, unconstitutionally to change the JNA’s make-up. 
According to Jović:

At their meeting on 30 July 1991, Kadijević reports to Milošević and Jović: 

‘The JNA is being transformed into an army of those who wish to remain in Yugoslavia, which at least means: Serbia,
the Serb people, plus Montenegro. It is withdrawing to territories and changing commanders in accordance with this principle
... Sloba warns him that he is being slow in implementing what he says. He should be more diligent. He protests, defends
himself, appears uncomfortable, yet he knows he is guilty.’
(BJ, 367) 
During the meeting between Milošević, Jović and Kadijević, according to Jović:

‘Veljko appears very confused, almost lost. He talks about the army’s defeat, about desertion, about the lack of
morale, about the danger of treachery by the still large number of Croats in the army.... 
Says that he should immediately dismiss two thousand officers to avoid the worst. Slobodan tells him to dismiss them,
that he should have done so before. Veljko can hardly restrain himself. He tells him: "it’s easy to talk". Veljko
then concludes: 

"the army will lose the war against Croatia, unless motivation and successful mobilisation can be ensured. This cannot
be accomplished with Yugoslavia’s semi-legality. Serbia and Montenegro should proclaim the army its own, and take
over command, financing, the war and everything else." ... 

We spent a long time disputing, resisting... we cannot accept the demand that the army should lose its Yugoslav name.
Serbia and Montenegro would lose practically all advantages, military and political, in such an event...’ 
(BJ, 387)

The same topic, another meeting involving Slobodan Milošević, Momir Bulatović, Branko Kostić, Veljko Kadijević,
Blagoje Adzić and Borisav Jović:

‘In our view this [that the JNA be taken over by Serbia and Montenegro] is bad from the international point of view...
it does not suit us politically to "leave" Yugoslavia... this would place ... the Serbian-Montenegrin army in the position
of an "aggressor" in the Serb areas outside Serbia.’ 
(BJ, 388-9).

‘[Kadijević] asks why Slobodan Milošević has never publicly defended the army and its mobilisation.’ 
(BJ, 389) 
As president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević has no constitutional say over the army, of course, but Kadijević accepts
his authority. Milošević and Jović need an army that obeys them and implements the Serbian leadership’s political
aims, but one that will be called Yugoslav. Kadijević accepts this instrumentalisation.

‘Slobodan does not ask Veljko for (General) Negovanović to be immediately dismissed... The army cannot do without
us. We could perhaps do without it - we could form our own army - but it is not clear how they could create their own
state.’ 
(BJ, 391)

Jović writes on 6 October 1991: 

‘I demand an urgent meeting with Milošević. We must agree among ourselves, in private. We’re not a supermarket,
to supply whatever the generals need. The policy must come from us, not from them. He agrees with me.’ 
(BJ, 392)

‘Slobodan does not quite trust Veljko, who constantly interferes in political issues... This is why he ignores every
initiative of Veljko’s that has a political character, and says: "Let him look after his own business. Let him do
what he’s supposed to be doing".’
(BJ, 402)

The extent of the army’s instrumentalisation can be seen also in the extent to which the Serbian political leaders
had made it serve them unconstitutionally in Serbia itself too. 
Jović notes on 27 January 1990: 

‘I call Kadijević to tell him to let his tanks take a turn through the cities of Kosovo, to scare them a little.
But he was not at home.’

On the following day: 

‘[Slobodan Milošević] calls up to ask me to find Veljko [Kadijević] and ask him to help. I found Adžić, the chief
of staff. He says that the SFRY Presidency’s decision on use of the army has been cancelled. They would need a new
decision. Veljko also calls, saying the same thing. He nevertheless agrees to send five helicopters (to demonstrate
over Prishtina)...’. 
(BJ, 96)

The same tanks paraded through the Belgrade streets during the peaceful demonstrations conducted by the opposition on
9 March 1991: 

‘I order Veljko to take the army onto the streets and occupy the space in front of all state institutions under threat.
Slobodan will send a formal written request, which we shall approve tomorrow at the meeting of the Presidency.’ 
(BJ, 283)

Jović notes on 7 June 1991: 

‘Slobodan and I visit Veljko Kadijević. We demand an answer to the question of whether the army will intervene, if
things ‘turn dramatic’ at the meeting that the opposition has called for 9 June. "It will, of course", replies Kadijević...’
(BJ, 338)

The uses to which the army was put, and by whom, can be seen also in the intervention in Slovenia in July 1991. Jović
writes:

‘Slobodan and I have made an appointment with Veljko Kadijević, which we see as decisive.’ 
‘The Serb people is completely confused and is joining the opposition in large numbers.’ 
‘We demand the following of Veljko Kadijević: 1. He must respond strongly to the Slovenes with all means, including
the air force. ... Then withdraw from Slovenia... This will raise the army’s morale, frighten Croatia and calm down
the Serb people.’ 
(BJ, 349) 
‘I consult Slobodan Milošević about the army’s plan [to bring down the governments of Slovenia and Croatia - SP]...
Asked what is to be done if we fail to win the necessary majority on the Presidency for the required decisions, he thinks
that we should decide with the members who are "for" and that the army will "obey".’ 
(BJ, 281)


Conspiratorial command over the JNA

The key strategic and tactical decisions, and command over the JNA, were not assumed, however, even by the unqualified
‘group of members’ of the Presidency (‘who were "for"’), but by a completely informal group: the so called ‘group
of six’, an informal conspiratorial group led by Milošević, Jović and Kadijević. 
At their meeting on 4 July 1990, Vejlko Kadijević informed Jović: 

‘The army will do all in its powers to prevent unconstitutional behaviour [proclamation of the declaration on Slovenia’s
independence - SP] as legally as is possible, and if the Presidency cannot provide such a decision then one must look
for other options ... the army will obey the order also of a group of members of the Presidency, even if they are not
a qualified majority.’ 
(BJ, 162)

According to Jović, at the meeting on 14 August 1991, Milošević, Jović and Kadijević form at Kadijević’s suggestion
a ‘group of six’ made up of Serbs and Montenegrins, with [usurped,] unconstitutional powers.

‘Meeting at Veljko Kadijević (Kadijević, Adžić, Milošević, Bulatović, B. Kostić, and I).’ 
‘Veljko Kadijević says that we must have a permanent system of coordination of this composition. The others are working
more systematically than us. This approach is dangerous for the army, but it cannot be avoided. It would be good to
form an expert staff of 5-6 people (Serbia, Montenegro, JNA) whose task would be to assess the situation and suggest
decisions.’ 
(BJ, 371) 
‘The idea of a systematic consultation of the six was accepted, but not the formation of a "staff" as well.’
(BJ, 372) 
As was decided, ‘the six’ continued to meet regularly. Jović records the following meetings of ‘the six’:

14 August 1991 (BJ, 371) 
5 September 1991 (BJ, 382-3) 
12 September 1991 (BJ, 385) 
20 September 1991 (BJ, 386) 
24 September 1991 (BJ, 387) 
28 September 1991 (BJ, 387) 
2 October 1991 (BJ, 391) 
5 October 1991 (BJ, 391-2) 
6 October 1991 (BJ, 392) 
9 October 1991 (BJ, 394) 
25 October 1991 (BJ, 402-3)

These meetings discussed and decided all aspects of the war, strategic and tactical, even operational:

- on ‘preparation of the army for war’, on how ‘the war must be offensive and of high intensity’, on the need
to ‘harmonise politics and propaganda, especially in regard to the people going to war’, on ‘the further management
of events’ 
(BJ, 383); 
- on whether ‘we’ (the six) have ‘the aim of using the army to defend the new frontiers of the people who wish
to remain in Yugoslavia, or to bring down the Croatian government’, on the ‘absolute necessity for mobilisation’
(BJ, 385); 
- on the failure of the plan (due to the failure of mobilisation) to ‘cut off Slavonia’, ‘to cut Zagreb off from
the south’, to ‘cut off Herzegovina’, to ‘push to the Adriatic’, which should have brought Croatia ‘to capitulation’,
and of the need to ‘devise a reduced plan’ 
(BJ, 386); 
on the fact that ‘there are still a large number of Croats in the army’, on the need for ‘Serbia and Montenegro
to proclaim the army their own’, ‘that the army cannot lose the Yugoslav name’ 
(BJ, 387); 
- on ‘staff changes in the army’, on the need to ‘fortify the lines reached’ and to ‘strengthen the units
with volunteers’, ‘that the units of Serb insurgents must be organised, and positions for defence of the established
lines fortified’, that ‘Slavonia must have an infantry that will control the liberated territory’ 
(BJ, 390-1); 
- that it was necessary to ‘work out the concept of a peace initiative combined with the concept of force’ 
(BJ, 392), etc.

The Six assumed full control of the army.


Unconstitutionality

Alteration of the JNA’s national structure and the use of the army described above, as well as the assumption of command
over the army, are unconstitutional, of course (and at times constituted also criminal acts). 
According to Article 240 § 2 of the SFRY constitution: 

‘The armed forces of SFRY form a single whole, and are composed of the JNA - as the joint army of all nations and
nationalities, all working people and citizens - and of the territorial defence, as the widest form of organised general
resistance.’

According to Article 242 of the SFRY constitution:

‘In regard to the composition of the officer cadre, and appointment to higher command and leadership positions in
the JNA, the principle is followed of the republics and autonomous provinces being represented as equally as possible.’
According to Art. 186 of the SFRY criminal code:

‘Any official who, on the basis of difference in nationality, race, religion, ethnicity, gender, language, education
or social position, refuses or limits the rights of citizens as established by the constitution, law or other provision
or general act, or who on the basis of such a difference provides citizens with privileges or favours, will be punished
by imprisonment of between three months and five years.’

According to Article 330 § 1 of the SFRY constitution:

‘The Presidency of SFRY works on the basis of compromise among its members.’

According to Article 313 § 3 of the SFRY constitution:

‘The Presidency of SFRY is the highest organ of leadership and command over the armed forces of SFRY in both war and
peace.’

According to Article 328, §§ 1 and 2 of the SFRY constitution:

‘The president of the Presidency of the SFRY in the name of the Presidency of the SFRY represents the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia, represents the Presidency of SFRY, convenes meetings of the Presidency of SFRY, chairs the meetings,
signs acts that the Presidency introduces, ensures implementation of the acts and decisions of the Presidency of SFRY,
issues documents on the ratification of international agreements, and receives the accreditation and departure letters
of diplomatic representatives accredited to the Presidency of SFRY.’
‘The president of the Presidency of SFRY, in the name of the Presidency of SFRY, exercises command over the armed
forces of SFRY in accordance with the constitution and federal law.’

According to Article 315 § 1, point 6 of the SFRY constitution:

‘The Presidency of SFRY, within the framework of its rights and duties: 
appoints, promotes and retires generals, admirals and other officers as specified by federal law; 
appoints and retires presidents, judges and lay judges of military courts, and military prosecutors.’

The constitution nowhere suggests that the federal defence minister should report to the president of the Republic of
Serbia, nor that the latter is empowered to ‘warn’ the federal secretary, ‘demand’ something of him, remind
him of his duty, or order him to replace generals or other officers (and certainly not on the basic of ethic or national
affiliation). 
Nor does the constitution anywhere envisage that the president of the Presidency should exercise command over the armed
forces without - let alone against - the views of the Presidency (in whose name he acts), and still less that he should
seek the opinion of the president of the Republic of Serbia on how to do that. 
It is also nowhere to be found in the constitution that the army should be used, without the permission of the Presidency,
with the aim of ‘frightening’ the population at permitted meetings of the opposition (‘if things turn dramatic’),
nor with the aim of ‘raising the army’s morale’, ‘frightening the Croats’ or ‘pacifying the Serb people’.
One may say that the conspirators destroyed the JNA both as an institution acting in accordance with the decisions of
the Presidency and as an army of all nations and nationalities (Art. 240 § 2 of the SFRY constitution). On 16 October
1992 the JNA removed the insignia of the SFRY state after Kadijević had resigned on 8 January 1992.


Aims of the Conspiracy:

Planning the violent overthrow of the governments in Croatia and Slovenia

On 25 February 1991 Jović notes under the heading 

‘The army’s plans for overthrowing the governments in Slovenia and Croatia and for resolving the crisis’:

- ‘The army’s basic idea consists in strongly relying upon the forces which are for Yugoslavia.’ 
(BJ, 277) 
- ‘Serbia, Montenegro, the army and the Serb parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are for Yugoslavia.’ 
(BJ, 276) 
- ‘to bring down, by a combination of political and military measures, the government first in Croatia and then in
Slovenia’ 
(BJ, 277) 
- ‘in the hesitant republics (Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) to bring down the leadership by combined political
measures - demonstrations and rebellions - or to change their direction. These activities are to be combined also with
military activities.’ 
(BJ, 277) 
- ‘The whole action to be led by those members of the SFRY Presidency which opt for this course, with reliance on
the army.’ 
(BJ, 277). 
- ‘In Croatia and subsequently in Slovenia, as a first variant, it might be military rule followed by the formation
of institutions with non-compromised individuals.’ 
(BJ, 278)

‘I consult Slobodan Milošević about the army’s plan. I read him all my notes, verbatim. He thinks it is all good,
but that Slovenia should be left in peace. It should be applied only to Croatia.’ 
‘Asked what we should do if we do not achieve a sufficient majority on the Presidency for the necessary decisions,
he thinks that we should decide with the members who are "for" and that the army will "obey". He thinks it logical that
we "remove" all those who resist this action by the Presidency.’ 
(BJ, 281)

In itself, the planning of these activities represents a criminal act on the basis of Article 114 of the SFRY criminal
code, which says:

‘Whoever commits an act designed to: limit or overthrow the government of the working class and the working people;
undermine the constitutionally established socio-economic order, the socio-political system or the system of self-management;
unconstitutionally overthrow the organs of self-management and government, their executive organs or the representatives
of the highest state organs; destroy brotherhood and unity or violate the equality of the nations and nationalities;
or anti-constitutionally change the federal order of the state, will be punished with imprisonment for at least a year.’
This is a criminal act of so-called ‘abstract threat’ (committed when something merely ‘could endanger a protected
object’, even when that did not actually materialise); it incriminates the very preparations (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Croatia I Kž-1878-72) as well as the actual attempt. Whether there was a possibility of danger resulting or
not is estimated on the basis of the circumstances 
(Commentary on the SFRY Criminal Code by a group of authors, Savremena administracija, Belgrade 1986, p.421).

According to Article 18 § 3 of the SFRY criminal code:

‘when the law prescribes punishment for the preparation of a certain criminal act, the preparation may consist of
acquisition or preparation of the means for execution of the criminal act; removing obstacles to execution of the criminal
act; collusion, planning or organising with others execution of the criminal act; as well as other activities creating
the conditions for direct execution of the criminal act that do not represent the activity of execution.


Planning the violent overthrow of SIV and the Presidency

The planned overthrow of the governments in Croatia and Slovenia did not happen, because in Jović’s view:

‘[Milošević’s] idea that the minority on the Presidency should decide [see above, BJ 281 - SP] is suspect. It
is a situation where the army decides, and this cannot be hidden.’ 
(BJ, 281)

And also because:

‘the army is in a terrible plight because it has no political "cover" for what it wants to do. It fears to act without
a "cover". But a decision of the Presidency without sufficient votes is not constitutional and does not provide such
"cover".’ 
(BJ, 281)

‘It would be best in my view to create empty space for the army to decide on its own.’ 
(BJ, 281).

But another step was taken to draw the army into the political showdown, by the introduction of emergency measures,
which Kadijević proposed - in the name of the armed forces and the general staff - to the Presidency on 12 March 1991.
This meeting was held three days after the opposition’s great demonstration on 9 March 1991, when Milošević sought
the army’s protection (BJ, 283). The Croatian representative [Mesić] opposed this, stating that 

‘a state of emergency is being proposed in order to save the Serbian leadership from the opposition’s pressure’
(BJ, 289). 

Apart from Jović, only the Vojvodina representative voted for the introduction of a state of emergency. The only thing
left now was to ‘create empty space’ (BJ, 281) for a military coup. 
On the following day, 13 March 1991 (at the time when a new mass meeting of the opposition was taking place), Jović
records:

‘Veljko told us [Milošević and Jović] openly in the presence of General Adžić: "We have opted for a military
coup." ... I asked him what he meant by a military coup. He replied: dismissal of the [federal] government and Presidency.
They will not interfere with the assembly, but will not permit it to meet. They will not interfere with the republican
governments or anything else, provided they support the coup. If not, they too will be forced out. Slobodan said nothing
and made no comment. ... Having heard Veljko out, I told him that I would resign the next day, after the meeting ...
I would give the army the space to act. I would speak to Nenad Bućin [of Montenegro - SP] and Jugoslav Kostić [of
Vojvodina - SP] about them doing the same.’ 
(BJ, 296)

Two days later, on 15 March 1991, Jović via Belgrade TV ‘leaves an empty space’ for a military coup - he resigns
from the Presidency, on the grounds that he cannot remain in a Presidency which: ‘seeks to tie the hands of the Yugoslav
People’s Army’ and ‘has displayed open distrust in the armed forces of the country’ (BJ, 306), although 

‘the Yugoslav People’s Army, i.e. the armed forces of the country, has neither the task nor the intention of interfering
in political life or influencing the making of political decisions concerning the country’s future’ 
(BJ, 305).

‘Bućin and Kostić also resigned. Slobodan Milošević made a statement that in these circumstance he no longer recognised
the decisions of the Presidency of SFRY and would not participate in its work [in his role as deputy member of the Presidency
for Serbia]’. 
(BJ, 306)

The army, however, ‘having made its own analyses’ (BJ, 308-9) did not carry out the coup without ‘political cover’.
Jović made the following comment on this:

‘They have made themselves look very strange. If they had all these analyses in place when they told us that they
had decided on a military coup, then it is not clear how they reached that decision. If they did not have this all in
mind, then they are not serious.’ 
(BJ, 310)

There is no doubt that a definite plan had existed - made by Kadijević, Jović and Milošević - for the unconstitutional
overthrow of the governmental organs, the SIV and the Presidency, and if necessary the organs of government in the republics.
Jović and Milošević had delivered the activities that the plan allotted to them - ‘creation of empty space’ -
Jović with his resignation from the Presidency and Milošević with his refusal to replace him there. They had done
all they could to permit realisation of the forbidden outcome, which did not occur because the army was ‘unserious’.
Taken in themselves, the planning of these activities represents a criminal act according to Article 114 and Article
18 § 3. of the SFRY criminal code [see the relevant passages cited above].


Unconstitutional alteration of the SFRY borders (through unconstitutional exclusion from SFRY of the Republic of Slovenia
and the Republic of Croatia)

Jović notes on 12 June 1990:

‘Session of the SFRY Presidency with the participation of the presidents of the republics and autonomous provinces.
Tuđman and Kučan present for the first time.’
‘Kučan and Tuđman posed identical questions: do we recognise them as the legal and legitimate representatives of
Slovenia and Croatia ... I replied that we did...’ 
(BJ, 153)

Two weeks later, on 27 June 1990, Jović writes:

‘Conversation with Veljko Kadijević. ... I tell Veljko that I would most gladly drive them [Croatia and Slovenia
- SP]  forcibly out of Yugoslavia by simply redrawing the borders and announcing that by their own decisions they have
placed themselves in that situation, but that I don’t know what to do with the Serbs in Croatia. I do not favour the
use of force, but we should place them before a fait accompli. The action should be worked out along these lines, with
a variant of holding a referendum prior to their expulsion, on the basis of which it would be decided how to redraw
the borders. Veljko agrees.’ 
(BJ, 160)

On the following day, Jović notes:

‘Conversation with Slobodan Milošević. ... He agrees with the idea of "expelling" Slovenia and Croatia, but asks
me whether the army will obey such an order? I tell him that it must carry out the order, and that I do not doubt it,
but my problem is what to do about the Serbs in Croatia and how to secure a majority on the Presidency for such a decision.’
‘Sloba gave me two ideas: first, that the "chopping off" of Croatia be done in such a way that the Lika-Banija and
Kordun municipalities, which have formed an association, would remain on our side, with the proviso that the people
there would later declare through a referendum whether they wish to stay or leave, and secondly that the representatives
of Slovenia and Croatia on the Presidency would be excluded from voting on the decision, because they do not represent
that part of Yugoslavia which is taking this decision. If the Bosnian agrees, we’ve got a two-thirds majority.’
(BJ, 161)

Unconstitutionality

According to Article 283 of the SFRY constitution:

‘The assembly of SFRY: 1. decides on changes to the SFRY constitution... 4. decides on changes to the borders of the
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.


Instigation and organisation of armed rebellion of the population of ‘Krajina’/arming of the insurgents/violent
and unconstitutional alteration of the borders of the Republic of Croatia.

Jović, on 17 May 1990:

‘We are taking measures to remove from Slovenia and Croatia the weapons in civilian depots of the TO [Territorial
Defence] and to transfer them to army depots. We shall not permit the TO weapons to be misused in conflicts that may
arise, or for forcible secession. We have practically disarmed them. Formally, this was done by the chief of the general
staff, but in practice by our order. The Slovenes and Croats have reacted sharply, but there is nothing they can do.’
(BJ, 146)

Jović records on 3 August 1990:

‘The Slovenes have firmly decided to go all the way, at the price of incidents, conflict and war.’ 
‘Veljko is all aglow. He is terribly happy. He said that he has never been happier, because they have ‘played their
cards’ so stupidly that he will ‘send them packing’ and not just them...’. 
(BJ, 174)

Jović, on 4 September 1990:

‘Veljko Kadijević gives me the latest assessment of the military-political situation.’ 
‘We must be ready for use of the army in Slovenia as early as September, and in Croatia maybe in October, and in Kosovo
at all times. It is no longer necessary to act preventively in relation to unrest provoked by these events, we should
let disturbances erupt and use them to remove those responsible for the situation.’ 
(BJ, 190) 

In his book Moje viđenje raspada ["My View of the Break-Up", Politika, Belgrade 1993], Kadijević explains the reasons
behind this tactic:

‘...deliberately to let the enemy attack first, so that the whole world can see who is the aggressor and what he wants...
to do the opposite, as some were suggesting, in addition to serious political losses in the given international circumstances,
we should have fallen right into the trap of a swift and destructive military retaliation, which in the first instance
would have struck at Serbia.’ 
(VK, 93-4).

Jović’s note of 26 January 1991:

‘I talk to Slobodan [Milošević] on the telephone. ... Slobodan is still sticking to what might have been possible
until recently, but the army would not do it - to ‘chop them off’ from Yugoslavia, but this is now no longer possible...
It would be best now to use the force that we have at our disposal (the army), and the democracy that we wish to impose
(referenda), in order to ensure a peaceful exit from the crisis and favourable solutions for the Serb people, and for
all others too if possible... Let the Croats impose war...’.
(BJ, 263)

Jović notes on 25 February 1991:

‘Veljko talks next about his idea for the concept of the action.’ 
‘To strengthen institutionally and politically the Serb Krajina and support its secession from Croatia, not publicly
but de facto.’ 
(BJ, 277)

In his book Moje viđenje raspada, Kadijević writes:

‘Bearing all this in mind, the aim of the JNA in Croatia was: to protect the Serb people in Croatia from attack by
the Croatian armed formations, and to enable them to consolidate military self-organisation for defence; at the same
time to prepare the JNA for war with Croatia, once Croatia had started it against the JNA. Then to execute the task
within the framework of ‘preventing inter-national conflicts.’ 
(VK, 127)

‘The JNA has fully realised the aims of this phase of the conflict - it has protected the Serb people in Krajina and
helped it prepare itself militarily and politically too for the events that were to follow, which is what the Serb people
in Croatia actually did.’ 
(VK, 128)

‘Croatia’s aim in the first phase was to establish its authority in the Serb areas of Croatia by using the police
and the army...’. 
(VK, 126)

‘The Croatian leaders’ judgement is that the main reason why Croatia ... has failed in its aim of breaking the resistance
of the Serb people in Croatia, and establishing full authority over the whole territory lying within the framework of
the existing administrative borders, is because of the role played by the JNA. Not only this - they are now fully aware
that they will never achieve this aim so long as the JNA remains there.’ 
(VK, 128)

‘The strategy and tactics for achieving this aim was based on the following ideas: to avoid armed confrontation with
the JNA, and to neutralise the JNA through political and propaganda instruments and activities.’
(VK, 126)

It is clear from this 

(a) that having fully disarmed Croatia, the conspirators sought war; 
(b) that they did not dare attack Croatia, for fear of outside intervention; 
(c) that they instead aided militarily and politically the insurgents in Krajina, encouraging them to secede (Jović
says not publicly but de facto); 
(d) that they prevented, by use of military force, the Croatian government from re-establishing itself on territory
belonging to its own republic, and placed their hopes in ‘incidents’ that they would ‘exploit’; and 
(e), that they did all this under the umbrella of ‘preventing inter-national conflicts’.

Such behaviour represents criminal participation in armed rebellion, as defined by Article 124 §1 (dealing with very
serious cases) of the SFRY criminal code.


Armed rebellion

Article 124:

‘Whoever participates in the preparation of an armed rebellion, or in an armed rebellion, will be punished by imprisonment
of at least a year.’ 
‘Whoever organises an armed rebellion, or participates in an armed rebellion as organiser or leader, will be punished
by imprisonment of at least five years.’

Article 139:

‘For a criminal act under Article 114; Article 115 § 5; Articles 116 to 121; Articles 123 to 128; Article 132, and
Article 136 § 1 of this law, which has caused the death of a person or has caused a threat to human life or was accompanied
by serious violence or great destruction, or has endangered the country’s security, or its economic and military forces,
or in other especially serious cases, the perpetrator will be sentenced to imprisonment of at least ten years or to
death.’


Conclusion

There is no doubt that under the conditions of our proposed thought experiment, and according to the laws of the SFRY
at the time of their activity, Milošević, Jović and Kadijević would have been sentenced by a Yugoslav court  for
serious criminal acts  against the security and constitutional order of the SFRY, acts punishable by a death sentence.
The three faced the typical dilemma of all plotters and subversives: if we fail, we shall be criminals; if we  succeed,
there will be no one to punish our crimes. They succeeded. This is why they were never tried for their basic crimes
in a domestic court, in accordance with laws valid tempore criminis (at the time those crimes were perpetrated). They
were tried only for secondary consequences of their treason:  genocide, war crimes, etc., and then only by an international
tribunal. 
The political consequences of this situation are enormous. The unpunished crime of treason, and the ‘presumption of
innocence’, allows Serb nationalism to perpetuate to this day the colossal lie of Milošević’s propaganda; to ensure
ideological continuity with the regime of Slobodan Milošević; and to prevent Serbian society from confronting the
difficult truth and creating for itself a new identity on that basis.


Appendix: the constitutional question

The starting point of this text is the assumption that the SFRY existed up to 8 October 1991, because on that day Slovenia
and Croatia proclaimed their independence (after a three-month moratorium). 
In his book Prestanak Jugoslavije [The Disappearance of Yugoslavia], Professor Vladimir Vodinelić argues that in the
domain of civil law, the date after which the statutes of the other republics and the federation should be treated as
‘foreign law’ in the new state should be 8 October 1991. 
The decisions of the Badinter commission point to a similar conclusion, starting above all from the commission’s correct
opinion that recognition has only a declaratory character. 
Some people take 15 January 1992, the day when these two states were internationally recognised, as the day of the end
of SFRY, but this would appear to be evidently wrong. 
(Milošević himself adopts the wholly unsustainable position that SFRY existed up to 27 April 1992, as is evident from
the Decision on the Proclamation of the Constitution of SRJ, according to which this Constitution was enacted by ‘the
Federal Council of the Assembly of SFRY’ (without the participation or agreement of four out of its six republics).)
But the question also arises, however, of whether the SFRY existed after the proclamation of Serbia’s constitution
on 28 September 1990, by virtue of which Serbia constituted itself as an ‘independent and sovereign’ state, and
explicitly excluded itself from the legal system of SFRY - regardless of the fact that it agreed to implement general
acts of that other state when that was in its interests, and regardless of the fact that it declared itself (contradictorily)
as being still ‘part of SFRY’. With this last declaration, Serbia was only expressing its will to continue to exercise,
without any grounds, rights in another state to which, as itself an independent state, it no longer belonged. 
Serbia also behaved as an independent state in making laws of its own that directly contradicted the laws of the SFRY.
If Serbia, by its own constitution and behaviour, was an independent state, then SFRY no longer existed, because the
federation had lost the power to execute its sovereign rights over 41 per cent of its territory and over 29 per cent
of its citizens. 
In addition, according to Article 2 of the SFRY constitution, ‘The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia...
is composed ...’ - there follows the list of the six republics and the two autonomous provinces, a list that naturally
includes the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the Socialist Autonomous
Province of Vojvodina. By virtue of the Serbian constitution, three of the eight constituent members of the federation
were constituted  as ‘sovereign and independent’ states. 

The question that is logically posed, of course, is how and why the other members of the federation tolerated and agreed
that an ‘independent and sovereign’ Serbia should continue to send its representatives to the SFRY Presidency and
take de facto part in its decision-making. The answer lies not on the legal but on the political plane: the other republics
feared the alliance of an aggressively nationalistic Serbia with the JNA. Thus, for example, on 24 January 1991 Kučan
met with the president of ‘independent and sovereign’ Serbia in order to ask him (which is granted) for permission
to leave SFRY! The power of ‘independent and sovereign’ Serbia to impose itself de facto upon another state in this
way was based exclusively on the threat to use force, which the others realistically judged to be real enough. Serbia’s
imposed participation de facto in the decision-making of ‘the remainder’ of the SFRY federal bodies was thus a purely
violent act.

If one accepts that SFRY ceased to exist on 28 September 1990, when Serbia constituted itself as ‘independent and
sovereign’, then one must conclude that on the so-called ‘rump’ Presidency (on which  the representatives of Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer sat), apart from the ‘representative’ of independent and sovereign
Serbia there sat only one legitimate member of that ‘Presidency’ - the representative of Montenegro! This ‘Presidency’
had only one member [and he was part of the conspiracy].

This question must be left to be resolved by experts on constitutional law. It remains important, however, for the proper
application of law in judging the behaviour of the perpetrators of criminal acts which has been the subject of this
essay. 



Sources quoted 

Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRY, Politika, Belgrade 1995 
Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada – vojska bez države, Politika, Belgrade 1993 
Miodrag Marović, Politika i politika, Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, Belgrade 2002 
Dragoš Ivanović, Bolest vladanja, zavereničko vladanje, Republika, Belgrade 2000 
Mlađan Dinkić, Ekonomija destrukcije, Belgrade 1995 
Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, Lex, pištaljke i laži, Belgrade 1997 
Dragoljub Todorović, ‘Razlozi za konstituisanje’, Srpska reč, no. 297, 5 June 2002 
Predrag Tašić, Kako sam branio Antu Markovića, NIP Mugri 21, Skopje 1993 
Vladimir Vodinelić, Prestanak SFRY – Pravne posledice, Pravni fakultet, Belgrade 1995