21:11:0 on 2008-8-20   http://pasta.cantbedone.org
http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dc2m8p62_282hrnv3zd6
http://larussophobe.wordpress.com/2008/08/19/felgenhauer-on-georgia/
Felgenhauer on Georgia
La Russophobe,   19 August 2008

The brilliant Pavel Felgenhauer,  writing in Novaya Gazeta and translated by Robert Amsterdam



Today it is perfectly obvious to me  that the Russian incursion into Georgia  was planned in advance;  moreover,  the
final political decision  to complete preparation  and start the war in August was,  it would seem,  taken already in
April.

And  the Ossetians intentionally provoked the Georgians,  and any kind of response,  tough or mild,  would have been
used as an excuse to attack.  And if the Georgians had endured without complaining,  then the Abkhazians would have
begun,  like they now do,  a long prepared operation for the «mopping up» of the upper part of the Kodori Gorge. 
If a war has been planned,  an excuse will always be found.

Towards August,  a significant part of the Black Sea Fleet ships  was ready for a lengthy battle sortie,  units of constant
readiness of the Land forces,  the airborne-landing forces and the marine infantry were ready to move,  while during
the «Caucasus-2008» exercise,  which ended on 2 August,  a week before the war,  the forces of the military-air forces,
the military-sea fleet and the army completed the last readiness inspection on a locality at the Georgian border.  
Concurrently, towards the beginning of August the Railroad troops in Abkhazia completed repair of railroad routes, 
along which this week tanks were flipped over to Inguri,  heavy equipment  and supplies for an approximately 10-thousand-strong
unit,  intruded  into Western Georgia without any excuse or formal reason. Naturally,  not for any «national-economy
aims»,  as Moscow officially declared,  the rapidly repaired railroad was used.

The state propaganda apparatus likewise carried out preparations,  working over the controlled population  with constant
reports about an inevitable Georgian attack  and about how the USA and the West --for whom this conflict was absolutely
unneeded,  were standing behind all of this.
Naturally,  one can not endlessly hold troops  and the fleet at 24-hour advance readiness. In October the weather would
worsen,  snow would close the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. Therefore the second half of August  was the deadline
for starting a full-scale war with Georgia.

At a NATO summit in Bucharest in April,  in which Putin took part personally,  it became clear  that the accession of
Georgia and Ukraine to the alliance,  although for the moment the decision was deferred,  was unavoidable.  
Russian civilian and military leaders  openly warned both the West and the authorities in Tbilisi and Kiev  that attempts
to «drag into NATO» (in the words of our diplomats) countries  that in Moscow are considered traditional patrimonial
estate  would lead to a crisis.  It was declared that Russia «using any means» would prevent the entry of Georgia
into NATO,  but this did not have any effect on Mikheil Saakashvili.  
Then events started to develop at an accelerated pace.

Putin entrusted the government with «elaborating measures  with respect to the provision of targeted assistance» to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia,  which legally meant a denial of Georgia's state sovereignty. 
Then,  a Russian fighter shot down a Georgian drone  over Abkhazia.  Combat units  with heavy attack weaponry were introduced
into Abkhazia  under the guise of peacekeepers and later railroad troops. There followed a series of manoeuvres,  incursions
of Russian combat airplanes into the Georgian sky,  a factual rejection of a diplomatic settlement to the conflict 
under contrived pretexts  and finally the war,  which was supposed to liberate Abkhazia and South Ossetia  once and
for all  of any Georgian population,  Tbilisi of Saakashvili,  and the Trans-Caucasus of NATO and the Americans.  
In principle  Moscow is even prepared  formally to preserve the territorial integrity of Georgia in a form of a kind
of confederation  and to give the Georgians the opportunity to democratically elect themselves as president anybody
whom,  preferably,  they will approve in Moscow as well.

That is precisely the same way the Russian leadership prepared in ’99 the incursion into Chechnya.  Then already in
early spring,  according to the testimony of former premier Sergey Stepashin,  a decision on principle was adopted to
start the war in August-September. All summer went on engineering works  and other preparation  for the deployment of
shock troops.  Putin and his team were then restoring the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;  today, 
it seems,  they have taken to getting the post-Soviet space in line.

In ’99  the incursion of Chechen fighters into Daghestan had been the excuse for war,  but its unexpected initial
success  led to a crisis  and to the replacement of Stepashin with Putin.

Today the unexpectedly mighty strike  by Saakashvili  – the instantaneous rout  of Ossetian formations –  also seriously
messed up the cards. 
Moscow could no longer pretend that it was merely the brave Ossetians  slugging it out  with the Saakashvili regime,
while our side was merely attempting to keep  the sides separated,  establish peace  and that was the only reason for
it to introduce troops.  
It became necessary  to start an overt invasion,  bear losses  and subject oneself to western pressure,  unbearable
for the Russian bureaucracy, integrated into the world financial system.
It became necessary to throw the troops into combat  in relatively small detachments. Enormous traffic jams arose  in
the Roki Tunnel (6 km in length),  which due to its narrowness  can only be used  for one-way alternate traffic,  on
the road to Java  and to Tskhinvali. The outdated,  dilapidated Russian equipment  was constantly breaking down. The
evacuation of the wounded and civilians,  the approach of volunteers  absolutely not needed  in the given situation
– all led to an enormous logistics crisis,  which is continuing today,  while the relatively small vanguard forces
had to be thrown into combat  on a just-in-time unit by unit basis.

The elite units,  including air-landing forces spetsnaz,  pulled forward towards Tskhinvali on 8 August,  for nearly
two days could not dislodge the Georgians from the city,  despite the massive use of artillery,  tanks and combat aviation.
The Georgians even wounded general Anatoly Khrylev, the commander of the 58th army,  who had set out  to the vanguard
to establish  order.  
The Georgian regular troops only left Tskhinvali  on the orders of their political leadership.  Deputy chief of the
General staff Anatly Nogovitsyn confessed that the armed forces of Georgia  are different from  those who 15 years ago
lost the war to the separatists: 

«In the present moment this is a modern,  well mobilized grouping,  outfitted with modern weaponry».

After cleaving Tskhinvali,  the Georgian troops continued their retreat.  By the 11 of August almost  the entire army
was concentrated around Tbilisi.  
By that time  on the territory of Georgia,  including Ossetia and Abkhazia,  up to 20 000. of our soldiers had invaded.
The vanguard detachments reached Gori,  occupied Zugdidi,  entered Senaki and demolished a Georgian military base there.
Vanguard intelligence entered the city-port Poti.  Georgian troops were retreating nearly everywhere,  not engaging
in combat.  
Russian troops got far away  from their bases of supply,  there are too few of them  for a successful occupation,  their
movements through Georgia  lost meaning  and only led to further losses in equipment  due to constant breakdowns.  
Having ordered a retreat,  the Georgian leadership  saved the regular army,  which with its lightning rout of the Ossetians
has elevated its prestige in society. 
Having saved the army,  Saakashvili preserved,  as it seems to him,  a united Georgia and simultaneously  the foundation
of his own regime,  while  he left the task of dealing with the Russian incursion  to western leaders and diplomats.
In all of its history the Georgian people  has lived at the crossroads  of warring world empires and has learned  a
flexibility in matters of survival  and an ability to use one strong opponent against another  that is beyond our wildest
dreams.  Some of today’s Russian leaders only imagine  that they are acting like Stalin.

The demolished military bases  and diverse  infrastructure  will be restored with western money,  and in the process
new jobs will appear as well.  The smashed radars and weaponry will be replaced with newer and better ones. 

In so doing,  Saakashvili has successfully solved his main strategic task  – he has internationalized the Ossetian
and Abkhazian problems  once and for all,  which in the end may result in the gradual displacement of Russia  and reduction
of its influence in the region. 

Already at the end of June in Tbilisi the French ambassador in Georgia Eric Fournier was declaring  in the presence
of a «Novaya Gazeta» correspondent: 

«The international community  does not consider Abkhazia and Ossetia  a serious problem.  We have Iran,  Afghanistan,
Sudan,  Lebanon,  Iraq. Nobody in Brussels regards  the possibility of deploying international peacekeeping forces in
the region. In any case,  the EU does not have spare soldiers for such a little-important question. 
This is altogether  the affair of the Russians,  Russia is the key player in the region».

Now all has cardinally changed,  the Russian incursion has roused Europe.  
President of France Nicolas Sarkozy  has advanced a peace plan,  coordinated with NATO allies  and with Japan,  which
envisages an unconditional cease-fire,  the return of all refugees,  including to Abkhazia,  the full withdrawal of
Russian and Georgian troops  from the zones of conflict and the introduction of international peacekeeping forces, 
who will likewise include a Russian contingent. 
The previous format of exclusive Russian peacekeeping  is now completely unacceptable to the West,  our aggression 
has crossed everything out.  
For simple people in the Caucasus,  for Ossetians,  Georgians,  Abkhazians and others  such an outcome means  real peace,
security,  huge foreign assistance  for the restoration and development of the region.  For Russia this can signify
a military-political defeat  as the result  of an apparently successful invasion.

It is understandable that the French plan  was rejected out of hand as unacceptable  by our ambassador in the UN Vitaly
Churkin,  but then Moscow began to maneuver.  Today’s Russia,  dependent on the West,  can speak a lot about its resurgent
might,  but in practice things turn out to be a bit different.  
The problem  is not only that the old equipment  is constantly breaking down,  while the Georgians are busy knocking
down  our supersonic strategic bombers.  All of the Russian leaders,  both from the faction of the «siloviki»,  and
the «liberals» – are in essence businessmen-billionaires,  their personal interests  are linked to the West,  with
stock market quotes,  their main political goal – the «modernization of Russia»,  while the incursion into Georgia
is ravaging all of them today  and clearly threatens even greater unpleasantnesses  in the future.  
Retaining the possibility of the integration of Russia with the West,  on Tuesday president Dmitry Medevedev declared
«about cessation of the operation with respect  to imposing peace in South Ossetia».  In the words of Nogovitsin,
this signifies cease-fire.

But nothing yet is finished.  In Moscow  they are still hoping to depose Saakashvili,  although this is unlikely to
happen,  and any successor of his,  for example the exile Irakli Okruashvili,  with whom Saakashvili  has publicly made
peace,  will be no better.
The conflict is complicated,  apparently,  by the personal strong enmity  between Saakashvili and Putin.  In diplomatic
and political circles in Tbilisi there is talk  about how Saakashvili responded disparagingly about «the Kremlinites»
in front of  witnesses. In a personal meeting Saakashvili told me for the record  that he had heard about these rumors,
but he himself had never said anything like this,  and « all of this is provocations by the Russian special services».
It is insufferable to come to terms  with the fact  that the hated Saakashvili,  who has taken Georgia out of the CIS,
has officially declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia  occupied territories,  and with whom our leaders  cannot compete
in public street politics,  nevertheless remains in power in Tbilisi. 
Circles around the Kremlin are demanding  the creation of a special international tribunal on crimes in the Caucasus.
(«Novaya gazeta»,  by the way,  considers this an imperative,  under the condition that the investigation touches
upon all sides of the conflict. – P.F.) However,  even if such a tribunal  were suddenly to be created,  although
the International criminal court already exists for dealing with war crimes,  then its jurisdiction would extend to
the Russian military-political leadership as well,  which can in first order find itself under fire for their previous
dealings in Northern Caucasus  and for the current ones. 
Once established,  the International tribunal would not depend on Russian power,  but would be subject to law.

According to the testimony of eyewitnesses,  onto the territory of Georgia has been introduced through the Roki Tunnel
a rocket brigade of the 58th army – «Uragan» systems of salvo fire (RSZO) «Uragan» and «Tochka-U» artillery
rockets. 
«Grad» RSZO systems (122 mm caliber) are extremely inefficient  for strikes on cities  and entrenched troops,  in
contrast to the significantly more powerful «Uragan» (220 mm). From the Tskhinvali rayon the «Tochka-U» can hit
Tbilisi and the surrounding rayons. The high-explosive-fragmentary warhead of the «Tochka-U» covers three hectares,
the cartridge type – 7.

The «Uragan» RSZO and the «Tochka-U» rockets were massively used for the bombardment of Chechnya  in the years 1999
and 2000,  which led to the massive deaths  of peaceful inhabitants and destruction.  
Last week,  targets in Western Georgia  were pelted from Abkhazia  with «Tochka-U» rockets:  the launches were registered
by the American global system for monitoring missile launches. The Abkhazian powers declared that it was they  who had
produced the launches of the artillery rockets. 
Now our side can likewise assert that it is the Ossetians  (and not the 58th army)  who are delivering strikes against
Tbilisi in revenge,  supposedly for Tskhinvali. Such strikes,  without a doubt,  will create in Tbilisi a frightened
panic,  and perhaps it will still be possible to succeed in overthrowing Saakashvili’s regime.

The cease-fire will be very shaky until that moment when foreign peacekeeping contingents enter Georgia.